We study the interplay of network connectivity and the issues related to the possibility, feasibility and optimality for unconditionally reliable message transmission (URMT) and unconditionally secure message transmission (USMT) in an undirected synchronous network, under the influence of an adaptive mixed adversary A (t b ,t o ,t f ,t p ) , who has unbounded computing power and can corrupt up to t b , t o , t f and t p nodes in the network in Byzantine, omission, fail-stop and passive fashion respectively. In URMT problem, a sender S and a receiver R are part of a distributed network, where S and R are connected by intermediate nodes, of which at most t b , t o , t f and t p nodes can be under the control of A (t b ,to,t f ,tp) . S wants to send a message m which is a sequence of ( ≥ 1) field elements from a finite field F to R. The challenge is to design a protocol, such that after interacting in phases 1 as per the protocol, R should be able to obtain m with probability at least 1 − δ, where 0 < δ < 1 2 , irrespective of any adversarial strategy of A (t b ,t o ,t f ,t p ) . The USMT problem has an additional requirement that A (t b ,to,t f ,tp) should not know anything about m in information theoretic sense.
Introduction
Achieving reliable and secure communication is a fundamental problem in the theory of communication.
In modern applied network security, there is a lot of emphasis on the use of virtual private networks (using cryptography), firewalls, virus scanners, etc. However, routers too are vulnerable [41] . Two problems have been identified if a router node is hacked. The hacker can shut down the node or forward incorrect information to the adjacent nodes in the network [10, 19] . Hence there is a need for considering an adversary who can disrupt the network in variety of ways. The problem of perfectly reliable message transmission (PRMT) and perfectly secure message transmission (PSMT) perfectly captures the scenario when a specific node in the network intends to send a message to another non-adjacent node with the help of other nodes and edges in the network, some of which may be hacked (corrupted) by an adversary.
In the problem of perfectly reliable message transmission (PRMT), a sender S is connected to a receiver R in an unreliable network; S wishes to send a message m chosen from a finite field F, reliably to R, in a guaranteed manner (with zero error probability), in spite of the presence of several kinds of faults in the network. The problem of perfectly secure message transmission (PSMT) has an additional constraint that the adversary should get no information about m in information theoretic sense. The faults in the network is modeled by an adversary who controls the actions of nodes in the network in a variety of ways and has unbounded computing power. Security against such an adversary is called information theoretic security, which is also known as perfect security. Notice that if S and R are connected by a direct edge, then PRMT and PSMT is a trivial task. The problem PRMT and PSMT dates back to Dolev et al [10] who studied these problems for the first time considering a Byzantine adversary.
The PRMT and PSMT are well-motivated problems for it being one of the fundamental primitives used by all fault-tolerant distributed algorithms like Byzantine agreement [24, 23, 11, 12] , multiparty computation [40, 18, 4, 3, 29, 7] etc. All these popular fault-tolerant distributed algorithms assume that the underlying network is a complete graph.When the graph is not complete, we can simulate the effect of the missing links using PRMT/PSMT protocols. There is another motivation to study PSMT problem. Currently, all existing public key cryptosystems, digital signature schemes are based on the hardness assumptions of certain number theoretic problems. With the advent of new computing paradigms, such as quantum computing and increase in computing speed, may render these assumptions ineffective. Hence it is worthwhile to look for information theoretically secure message transmission schemes.
There are various settings in which PRMT and PSMT problem has been studied extensively in the past. For example, the underlying network model may be undirected graph [10, 27, 1, 22] , directed graph [28, 9] or hypergraph [16, 9, 30] . The communication in the network could be synchronous [10, 32] or asynchronous [31] . The faults could be passive, fail-stop, Byzantine or sometimes mixed/hybrid faults [17] . The number of faulty nodes may be bounded by a fixed constant (threshold adversary) [10, 32] or the potential sets of faulty nodes may be described by a collection of subsets of nodes (nonthreshold adversary) [20] , while the adversary may be mobile [26] or adaptive [10, 32] . We may use the following parameters (shown in Table 1 ) i) Underlying Network, ii) Type of Communication, iii) Adversary capacity, iv) Adversary Behavior to describe different settings/models for studying PRMT and PSMT. For example, one may ask: what is the necessary and sufficient condition for perfectly reliable message transmission over a undirected graph thwarting a threshold adaptive adversary? Like this, hundreds of different models/settings can be formulated and many of them are used in practice. Table 1 : The taxonomy of the settings in which PRMT/PSMT can be studied.
communicated by S and R in the protocol (d) amount of computation done by S and R in the protocol. Irrespective of the settings in which PRMT and PSMT are studied, the following issues are common:
(i) Possibility: When is a protocol possible in the given network?
(ii) Feasibility: Once the existence of a protocol is ensured then does there exist a polynomial time efficient protocol on the given network?
(iii) Optimality: Given a message of specific length, what is the minimum communication complexity (lower bound) needed by any protocol to transmit the message and how to design a protocol whose total communication complexity matches the lower bound on the communication complexity?
The issues (a), (b) and (c) have been completely resolved for certain settings. For certain network settings, these issues has been partly resolved where as for certain settings, nothing is known. For example, the issues (a), (b) and (c) for PRMT in undirected synchronous networks tolerating threshold adaptive Byzantine adversary in solved in [10, 27] . Similarly, issues (a), (b), (c) for PSMT in undirected synchronous networks tolerating threshold adaptive Byzantine adversary is solved in [10, 27, 35, 37, 13, 22] . Desmedt et.al [9] and Arpita et.al [28] have studied the issues related to the possibility and feasibility of PSMT protocols in directed networks tolerating threshold adaptive Byzantine adversary. On the other hand, nobody has addressed the issues (a), (b) and (c) for PSMT in arbitrary directed hypergraphs tolerating mobile mixed adversary. In most of the cases, the techniques used to address (a), (b) and (c) in one setting cannot be directly adapted or extended to address the same issues in other settings. For example, the techniques used to design feasible PSMT protocols in directed networks [28] are very different from the one which are used to design PSMT protocols in undirected networks [27] . It is a well-known fact that in several problem domains randomization helps to a great extent in arriving at more efficient and simpler solutions than their deterministic counterpart. The problem domains range from famous number theoretic randomized primality testing algorithms to various distributed computation tasks like verifiable secret sharing (VSS) [29, 7] , multiparty computation [7, 2, 8] to name a few. In this work, we focus on the effect of randomization on PRMT and PSMT problems. We name the probabilistic PRMT and PSMT as unconditionally reliable message transmission (URMT) and unconditionally secure message transmission (USMT) respectively. The problem of URMT is identical to the problem of PRMT except that R should correctly receive S's message with probability at least 1 − δ (for any 0 < δ < 1/2), instead of probability 1, as in case of PRMT. In USMT, in addition to the conditions of URMT, S's message must be hidden information theoretically from the adversary. The differences among PRMT, URMT, PSMT and USMT are summarized in Table 2 . Table 2 : Differences Among PRMT, URMT, PSMT and USMT. Intuitively, the allowance of a small probability of error in the transmission (only in the reliability) should result in improvements in both the fault tolerance as well as the efficiency aspects of reliable and secure protocols. What exactly is the improvement? -this is the central question addressed in this paper. More specifically, in this paper, we address issues related to possibility, feasibility and optimality in the context of URMT and USMT. Now as in the case of PRMT and PSMT, URMT and USMT can also be studied in various network settings and adversary model as presented in Table  1 . In this paper, we completely resolve issues (a), (b) and (c) in the context of URMT and USMT, in undirected synchronous network, tolerating an threshold adaptive mixed adversary A (t b ,t o ,t f ,t p ) . A mixed adversary A (t b ,t o ,t f ,t p ) , with unbounded computing power controls disjoint set of t b , t o , t f and t p nodes in the graph (excluding S, R) in Byzantine, omission, fail-stop and passive fashion respectively.
Definition 1 Failstop Corruption:
A node P is said to be fail-stop corrupted if the adversary can crash P at will at any time during the execution of the protocol. But as long as P is alive, P will honestly follow the protocol and the adversary will have no access to any information or internal state of P. Once P is crashed, then it will remain inactive for the rest of the protocol execution.
Definition 2 Omission Corruption:We say that a node P is omission corrupted, if the adversary can crash P at will at any time during the execution of the protocol. But as long as P is alive, it will follow the instructions of the protocol honestly. The adversary can eavesdrop the internal data of P but cannot make P to deviate from the proper execution of the protocol. Once P is blocked, it can again become alive at some later stage of the protocol and start following the protocol honestly.
Definition 3 Passive Corruption:
A node P is said to be passively corrupted if the adversary has full access to the information and internal state of P. But P honestly follows the protocol execution.
Definition 4 Byzantine Corruption: A node P is said to be Byzantine corrupted if the adversary fully control the actions of P. The adversary will have full access to the computation and communication of P and can force P to deviate from the protocol and behave arbitrarily.
The fail-stop error models a hardware failure caused by any natural calamity or manual shutdown. Also the nodes which are fail-stop corrupted cannot be passively listened by the adversary. On the other hand, nodes corrupted in omission fashion can be eavesdropped by the adversary. Thus omission error can be considered as a combination of fail-stop and passive corruption with the exception that unlike fail-stop error, a node which is crashed once due omission error may become alive during later stages of the protocol. Note that though omission adversary has eavesdropping capability, it also has blocking capability. Thus it is stronger than passive and failstop corruption. But it weaker than Byzantine corruption. Since Byzantine and omission corrupted nodes can also be eavesdropped, the maximum number of nodes which can be eavesdropped by the adversary is bounded by t b + t o + t p . We assume that the adversary is a centralized adversary and can collectively pool the data from the nodes under its control and use it according to his own choice in any manner. The adversary is adaptive [7] . Thus he is allowed to dynamically corrupt nodes during the protocol execution depending on the data seen so far from the corrupted nodes. So before the protocol execution, it is not known in advance which nodes are going to be influenced by adversary and in what way the nodes will be corrupted by the adversary. However, the total number of nodes that can be under the control of the adversary in a certain fashion (Byzantine/omission/failstop/passive) throughout the protocol is bounded by a threshold. Also once a node is under the control of the adversary in some fashion, then it will remain corrupted in the same fashion throughout the protocol.
Why to study mixed adversary: In a typical large network, certain nodes may be strongly protected and few others may be moderately/weakly protected. An adversary may only be able to failstop(/eavesdrop in) a strongly protected node, while he may affect in a Byzantine fashion a weakly protected node. Thus, we may capture the abilities of an adversary in a more realistic manner using four parameters t b , t o , t f , t p where t b , t o , t f , t p are the number of nodes under the influence of the adversary in Byzantine, omission, failstop and passive adversary, respectively (for more formal definition see Section 2). Also it is better to grade different kinds of disruption done by adversary and consider them separately, rather than treating every kind of fault as Byzantine fault as this is an "overkill".
Comparing our results with the existing results for PRMT and PSMT in undirected networks show that randomness and probabilistic approaches lead to improved fault tolerance, communication, phase and computational complexities.
Existing Literature
The problem of PRMT and PSMT dates back to Dolev et. al [10] who presented the first ever true characterization (POSSIBILITY) for PRMT and PSMT on a undirected synchronous network tolerating threshold adaptive Byzantine adversary, A t b . Dolev et. al. [10] abstracted the network in terms of channels and concentrate on solving PRMT and PSMT problem for a single pair of processors, the sender S and the receiver R, connected by n parallel and synchronous bi-directional channels w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n , also known as wires. 2 In the worst case, the adversary can corrupt an entire wire by controlling a single node (say the first node) on the wire. Hence, A t b (threshold adaptive Byzantine adversary) can corrupt upto t b wires in Byzantine fashion. Similarly, A (t b ,t o ,t f ,t p ) can control disjoint set of t b , t o , t f and t p wires in Byzantine, omission, fail-stop and passive fashion respectively. We now recall the existing results for PRMT and PSMT in undirected synchronous networks tolerating threshold adaptive Byzantine (A t b ) and mixed (A (t b ,to,t f ,tp) ) adversary in Table 3 and Table 4 . Table 3 : Connectivity Requirement and Lower Bounds for PRMT and PSMT in Undirected Networks. r denotes number of phases and denotes the message size in terms of field elements.
Model
Connectivity Requirement Lower Bound on Communication between S and R (n) Complexity PRMT(Byzantine Adversary)
for r ≥ 3 [34] PSMT(Mixed Adversary)
) for r ≥ 2 [34] The problem of URMT and USMT in undirected synchronous networks in the presence of threshold adaptiveByzantine adversary A t b was first defined and solved by Franklin et al [14] 3 . As one of the key results, they have proved that over undirected graphs, URMT (USMT) tolerating A t b is possible if and only if PRMT (PSMT) tolerating A t b is possible! Subsequent works on URMT and USMT include [15, 39, 9] . However, all these results try to address the issue of possibility and feasibility of URMT and USMT protocols and that too only in the presence of threshold Byzantine adversary. In [21] , Kurosawa et.al have addressed the issue of optimality of single phase USMT in undirected networks tolerating threshold Byzantine adversary. Most recently, Srinathan et.al [36] and Shankar et.al [33] have given the characterization for the possibility of URMT in arbitrary directed graphs tolerating nonthreshold and threshold Byzantine adversary respectively. However, to the best of our knowledge, no research work has ever simultaneously addressed the issue of possibility, feasibility and optimality of URMT and USMT protocols in any network model tolerating threshold mixed adversary.
Our Contribution
As mentioned earlier, any reliable/secure protocol is analyzed by the the connectivity requirement of the network, the number of phases required by the protocol, the total number of field elements communicated by S and R throughout the protocol and the computation done by S and R. The trade-offs among these 
• ≥ n; Polynomial computation and communication complexity [35] . O( n n−t b parameter are well studied in the literature in the context of PRMT and PSMT in undirected synchronous network tolerating threshold Byzantine adversary [27, 37, 1, 22] . In this paper, we investigate the trade-off for URMT and USMT in the presence of threshold adaptive mixed adversary, which is to our knowledge, the first attempt in the literature of URMT and USMT.
So we present characterization, lower bound on communication complexity and protocols that matches the lower bound for URMT and USMT. In summary, for URMT we show the following:
• URMT between S and R tolerating A (t b ,to,t f ,tp) is possible iff the network is (2t
• Any single phase URMT protocol tolerating
) field elements to reliably transmit (with high probability) field elements.
We also design single phase polynomial time communication optimal URMT protocol whose communication complexity satisfies our proven lower bound. As a corollary, we show that our single phase URMT protocol has a special property that it achieves reliability with constant factor overhead (i.e. sending field elements by communicating O( ) field elements) when executed only under the presence of Byzantine adversary (i.e., t o = t f = t p = 0).
• Any multiphase URMT protocol, from S to R over n ≥ 2t b + t o + t f + 1 wires communicates Ω( ) field elements to reliably transmit (with high probability) field elements.
An O(log t f +to n−t f −to ) phase PRMT protocol which sends field elements by communicating O( ) field elements is presented in [38] . The protocol of [38] is also a valid multiphase URMT protocol (since any PRMT protocol is by default a URMT protocol with δ = 0) satisfying the communication complexity lower bound for multiphase URMT. The design of a bit optimal multiphase URMT protocol with lesser number of phases is left as an open problem.
For USMT problem, we show the following:
• Any single phase USMT protocol that achieves perfect secrecy (with negligible error probability of δ > 0 in reliability) tolerating A (t b ,t o ,t f ,t p ) is possible iff there exists n ≥ 2t b + 2t o + t f + t p + 1 vertex disjoint paths between S and R.
• Any single phase USMT protocol over n ≥ 2t b + 2t o + t f + t p + 1 vertex disjoint paths between S and R, tolerating
) field elements in order to securely send an -field element message with very high probability.
We also design polynomial time communication optimal single phase USMT protocol whose communication complexity satisfies the above lower bound for single phase USMT. This shows that our lower bound is tight.
• Multiphase USMT between S and R in an undirected network tolerating
and only if the network is (
• Any r-phase (r ≥ 2) USMT protocol which securely sends field elements in the presence of
We also design polynomial time communication optimal four phase USMT protocol whose communication complexity satisfies the above lower bound for multiphase USMT. This shows that our lower bound is tight.
Our four phase USMT protocol against A (t b ,t o ,t f ,t p ) has a special property that it achieves secrecy with constant factor overhead (sending field elements by communicating O( ) field elements) when executed only under the presence of Byzantine adversary (i.e. t o = t f = t p = 0). However, against only Byzantine adversary, USMT with constant factor overhead in communication complexity can be achieved in two phases itself. One such protocol is also presented in this paper. We now tabulate the results on URMT and USMT in Table 5 and Table 6 .
Remark 1
In any URMT and USMT protocol, the communication complexity should be a function of δ which is the error probability of the protocol. However, in the results summarized in Table 5 and Table  6 Tables 3 and 4 Tables 5 and 6 can be represented in terms of bits by multiplying O(log(n) + κ). Table 3 with Table 5 and Table 4 with Table 6 , we find that allowing a negligible error probability has tremendous effect on reliable and secure message transmission in terms of POSSIBILITY, FEASIBILITY and OPTIMALITY. Many practical scenarios can be shown where no optimal PRMT or PSMT protocol exist but optimal URMT and USMT protocol does exist, thus showing the power of allowing negligible error probability in the reliability of the protocols (without sacrificing perfect secrecy). 
can be represented in terms of bits by multiplying O(log(n)).

Similarly, the communication complexity figures presented in terms of field elements in
Now, comparing
) for r ≥ 2 * Table 6 : Protocols with Optimum Communication Complexity. is the message size in terms of field elements. n denotes respective connectivity requirement specified in Table 5 . All the * marked results are presented in this paper.
Model
Communication Complexity Number of Phases Remarks
Techniques Used
The techniques used for designing PRMT and PSMT protocols are completely different from the techniques used for designing URMT and USMT protocols. The existing URMT and USMT protocols [14, 9] use the idea of information theoretic authentication schemes and check vectors along with error correcting codes. The check vectors are introduced in [29] for information checking (IC) protocols, which are used to generate IC signatures. The IC signatures can be used as a semi digital signature [7, 29] . Using these ideas, one can design feasible URMT and USMT protocols in undirected networks tolerating mixed adversary. However, the resultant protocols will be cumbersome and will not be communication optimal against mixed adversary. To design optimal protocols against mixed adversary, we introduce a new technique, called Extrapolation Technique. Using Extrapolation Technique, we can design communication optimal URMT protocol against mixed adversary. By using a slight variant of Extrapolation Technique, we can also design communication optimal USMT protocol tolerating mixed adversary. The Extrapolation Technique is first of its kind and is of independent interest.
Organization of the Paper
This paper is mainly divided into four main sections, namely single phase URMT, multiphase URMT, single phase USMT and multiphase USMT.A comprehensive comparison is done on the tasks that are significantly improved by the application of probabilistic approaches (URMT/USMT) (as compared to PRMT/PSMT) at the end of each section.
Network Model, Adversary Model and Definitions
The underlying network is a connected synchronous network represented by an undirected graph where S and R are two non-adjacent nodes of the graph (for if S and R are adjacent then PRMT and PSMT can be solved trivially). All the edges in the network are reliable and secure but the nodes can be corrupted. Following the approach of Dolev et. al. [10] , we abstract away the network and concentrate on solving URMT and USMT problem for a single pair of processors, the sender S and the receiver R, connected by n parallel and synchronous bi-directional channels w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n , also known as wires. The reason for such an abstraction is as follows: suppose some intermediate node between S and R is under the control of the adversary. Then all the paths between S and R which passes through that node are also comprised. Hence, all the paths between S and R passing through that node can be modeled by a single wire between S and R. A wire which is controlled in a failstop fashion may fail to deliver any information, but if it delivers any information then it will be correct. However, the adversary will have no idea about the information that passed through a wire which is controlled in failstop fashion. Also, once a failstop controlled wire crashes, then it will remain inactive for the rest of the protocol. A wire which is passively controlled will always deliver correct information. However, the adversary will also completely know the information, which passed through a passively controlled wire. A wire which is controlled in omission fashion behaves in a similar fashion as a failstop controlled wire. However, the adversary will also know the information that passed through a omission controlled wire. Moreover, a crashed wire which is controlled in omission fashion, may again become alive later and start sending data again. A Byzantine corrupted wire may deliver correct information (if the adversary chooses not to alter the information) or it may deliver incorrect information. However, in any case, the adversary will completely know the information, which passed through a Byzantine corrupted wire.
Since Byzantine and omission corrupted nodes can also be eavesdropped, the maximum number of wires which can be eavesdropped by the adversary is bounded by t b + t o + t p . We assume that the adversary is a centralized adversary and can collectively pool the data from the wires under its control and use it according to his own choice in any manner. The adversary is adaptive [7] . Thus he is allowed to dynamically corrupt wires during the protocol execution depending on the data seen so far from the corrupted wires. So before the protocol execution, it is not known in advance which wires are going to be influenced by adversary and in what way the wires will be corrupted by the adversary. However, the total number of wires that can be under the control of the adversary in a certain fashion (Byzantine/omission/failstop/passive) throughout the protocol is bounded by a threshold. Also once a wire is under the control of the adversary in some fashion, then it will remain corrupted in the same fashion throughout the protocol.
Throughout this paper, we use m to denote the message that S wishes to send to R. The message is assumed to be a sequence of elements from the finite field F with ≥ 1. The size of F is a function of δ which is the error probability of the URMT and USMT protocol. In our protocols, we show how to set the size of F as a function of δ, so that we bound the error probability by δ. Since we measure the size of the message in terms of the number of field elements, we also measure the communication complexity in units of field elements. Notice that "Unconditional Reliability" says that R can obtain a wrong message with small probability δ. We now define a strictly stronger notion of "Unconditional Reliability" which we call as "Strong Unconditional Reliability". A URMT protocol that achieves "Strong Unconditional Reliability" always outputs the correct message ; otherwise it fails with output NULL, but it never outputs an incorrect message. Precisely, in an URMT protocol that achieves "Strong Unconditional Reliability", R can detect whether he has correctly reconstructed the message sent by S or not. The characterization for URMT tolerating mixed adversary is as follows:
Theorem 2 Any r ≥ 1 phase URMT between S and R against a threshold adaptive mixed adversary
wires between S and R. To send a message m, S simply broadcasts m to R over the n wires. It is easy to see that R will receive m with probability one by taking majority 4 . Only if part: We now show that if the network is not (2t
Consider the network N , induced by N , on deleting (t o + t f ) vertices from a minimal vertex cutset of N . This can be viewed as an adversary crashing the communication over t o + t f wires, which are under its control in omission and failstop fashion respectively. It follows that N is not (2t b +1)-(S,R)-connected. Evidently, if Π is a URMT protocol on N , then Π is a URMT protocol on N , where Π is the protocol Π restricted to the players in N . However, from Theorem 1, Π is non-existent. Thus Π is impossible too.
2
Significance of Theorem 2: Theorem 2 strictly generalizes Theorem 1 because we obtain the latter by substituting t o = t f = 0 in the former. Now consider a network, which is 4-(S,R)-connected. From Theorem 1, on this network, any URMT protocol can tolerate at most one Byzantine fault. However, according to Theorem 2, it is possible to tolerate one additional faulty node, which can be either omission or fail-stop faulty. Thus our characterization shows more fault tolerance in comparison to the existing results. This is one of the motivations for studying URMT and USMT in the context of mixed adversary. Though allowing a negligible error does not help in the possibility of reliable message transmission protocols, in the sequel, we show that allowance of a negligible error probability in transmission significantly reduces the communication complexity in comparison to perfect (zero error) transmission.
Comparison 1 (Possibility of PRMT vs Possibility of URMT) From
Lower Bound on Communication Complexity of Single phase URMT Protocol
We now prove the lower bound on the communication complexity of any single phase URMT protocol tolerating mixed adversary
Theorem 3 Any single phase URMT protocol, from S to
R over n ≥ 2t b +t o +t f +1 wires, communicates Ω( n n−(t b +t o +t f ) ) field
elements to transmit a message containing field elements tolerating
Proof: In any single phase URMT protocol, the concatenation of the information sent over n wires can be viewed as an (probabilistic) error correcting code which can correct t b Byzantine errors and t o + t f erasures with an arbitrarily high probability. Without loss of generality, the domain of the set of possible values of the data sent along a wire can be assumed to be the same for all the wires 5 . Let S be the set of possible values of the data sent along the wires. Thus, each codeword can be viewed as concatenation of n elements from S which can be represented by n log |S| bits. Now, the removal of any ( , which violates the URMT communication property (in any URMT protocol, receiver should be able to receive the message with probability more than 1 2 ). Therefore, all shortened codewords containing n − (t b + t o + t f ) elements from S are distinct. This implies that there are same number of shortened codewords as original codewords. But the number of shortened codewords can be at most C = |S| (n−(t b +t o +t f )) . Now each shortened codeword can be represented by log C = (n − (t b + t o + t f )) log |S| bits. Since, for error-correction, we need to communicate the longer codeword containing n log |S| bits, reliable communication of shortened codeword of k = log C bits incurs a communication cost of at least n log |S| bits. Hence communication of a single bit incurs communication of n (n−(t b +to+t f ) bits. So to communicate elements from a field F, represented by log |F| bits, Ω(
log |F|) bits need to be sent. Since log |F| bits represents one field element from F, communicating elements from F requires a communicating Ω( Table 3 , third row), the same for URMT is Ω( 
Remark 2 In any URMT protocol designed over a field F, the size of the field depends upon the error probability δ of the protocol (this is demonstrated in next section). From Theorem 3, any URMT protocol to send field elements from F need to communicate Ω(
n (n−(t b +t o +t f )) log |F|) bits.
Thus the communication complexity of any single phase URMT protocol is a function of δ (since |F| is a function of δ), though it is not explicitly mentioned in the expression derived in Theorem 3. It should also be noted that communication complexity explicitly depends upon the message size .
Comparison 2 (Communication Complexity of Single Phase PRMT and URMT:) While the lower bound on the communication complexity of any single phase PRMT tolerating mixed adversary is
Ω( n (n−(2t b +to+t f ) ) field elements (seen (n−(t b +to+t f ) ) field
elements (Theorem 3). Recall that as pointed out in Comparison 1, the connectivity requirement for both PRMT and PSMT is that
n ≥ 2t b + t o + t f + 1. Assuming n = 2t b + t o + t f + 1,
) field elements respectively. Now if t b = Θ(n) then the lower bound for single phase URMT becomes Ω( ) field elements. This implies that for t b = Θ(n), communication of field elements requires transmission of Ω(n ) field elements for PRMT and Ω( ) field elements for URMT. Now notice that PRMT and URMT tolerating an adaptive Byzantine adversary
Hence the conclusion is that in the presence of A t b the lower bounds on the communication complexity of any single phase PRMT and URMT are Ω(n ) and Ω( ) field elements respectively. This clearly shows that allowing a negligible error probability helps in significant reduction in the lower bound on the communication complexity of reliable protocols.
In the next section, we design a single phase communication optimal URMT protocol. The same protocol when executed in the presence of A t b communicates O( ) field elements for sending field elements and thus achieves reliability with constant factor overhead.
Single Phase Communication Optimal URMT Protocol Tolerating
Let S and R be connected by n = 2t b + t o + t f + 1 wires, denoted as W = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n }, of which at most t b , t o , t f and t p are under the control of A (t b ,t o ,t f ,t p ) in Byzantine, omission, failstop and passive fashion respectively. We now present a communication optimal single phase URMT protocol URMT Single Phase, which delivers a message containing (t b + 1)n field elements by communicating O(n 2 ) field elements in single phase with (arbitrarily) high probability. This shows that the lower bound on the communication complexity of single phase URMT proved in the previous section is tight. URMT Single Phase has a special feature that it achieves reliability with constant factor overhead, when executed only in the presence of Byzantine adversary A t b (i.e., t o = t f = t p = 0). Let δ be a bound on the probability that the protocol may fail to deliver the correct message. We require the size of the field F to be at least
Remark 3 Our single phase protocol URMT Single Phase is a strong URMT protocol (see Definition 11).
Before presenting the protocol, we describe a novel technique, called as Extrapolation Technique which we use in designing the protocol URMT Single Phase. 
Finally, we obtain a square array D of size n × n containing n 2 elements, where
C is the sub-matrix of D containing last t b + t o + t f rows. Thus D is the row concatenation of matrix A of size (t b + 1) × n (containing elements of m) and matrix C. The elements of C are obtained from A using the above described technique which will be referred subsequently by Extrapolation Technique.
We now prove certain properties of the array D.
Lemma 1
In D, all the n elements of any column can be uniquely generated from any t b + 1 elements of the same column.
Proof: The proof follows from the simple observation that the n elements along any column of D lie on a t b degree polynomial and any t b + 1 points on a t b degree polynomial are enough to reconstruct the t b degree polynomial. 1. S generates a rectangular array D containing n 2 field elements, from the (t b + 1) × n elements of message m using Extrapolation Technique. S then forms n polynomials p j (x), 1 ≤ j ≤ n, each of degree n − 1, where p j (x) is formed using the j th row of D as follows: the coefficient of
2. S chooses another n secret and random field elements, α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n , which are independent of the message m and the elements of rectangular array D. Over wj, S sends the following to R: the polynomial pj(x), the secret value α j and the n tuple
Message Recovery by R:
1. Let F denotes the set of wires that delivered nothing and let B denotes the set of wires that delivered invalid information (like higher degree polynomials etc.). Note that the wires in B are Byzantine corrupted because omission or fail-stop controlled wires are not allowed to modify the information passing over them. R removes all the wires in (F ∪ B) from W, to work on the remaining wires in W \ (F ∪ B), out of which at most t b − |B| could be Byzantine corrupted. Let R receives p j (x), α j and v ji ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n over wj ∈ W \ (F ∪ B). We say that wj
. Among all the wires in W \ (F ∪ B), R checks if there is a wire contradicted by at least (t b − |B|) + 1 wires. All such wires are Byzantine corrupted and removed (see Lemma 4).
2. To retrieve m, R tries to reconstruct the array D as generated originally by S. Let D represents the corresponding array which R tries to recover at his end. Corresponding to each w j ∈ W \ (F ∪ B), which is not removed in previous step, R fills the j th row of D in the following manner: coefficient of
th column in the j th row of D .
3. After doing the above step for each w j ∈ W \ (F ∪ B), which is not removed in step 1 of message recovery, R has at least t b + 1 rows inserted in D (see Lemma 6) . R then checks the validity of these rows as follows: let
Note that at this point, each column will have at least t b + 1 elements, which are enough to do the checking. Proof: We consider the worst case, where t o + t f wires (which are omission and failstop corrupted) crash and fail to deliver any information. So R will receive information over 2t b + 1 wires, of which at most t b could be Byzantine corrupted. At the beginning of step 3 of message recovery, there are at least t b + 1 rows present in D . This follows from the fact there always exist t b + 1 honest wires which will deliver correct polynomials to R. As mentioned in Lemma 4, any honest wire will be contradicted by at most (t b − |B|) wires and hence will not be removed by R during step 1 of message recovery. So the coefficients of the polynomials corresponding to these honest wires will be present in D . Now if w j (which has delivered a faulty polynomial p j (x) = p j (x)) is not removed during step 1 of message recovery, then during step 2 of message recovery, the coefficients of p j (x) are inserted in the j th row of D . Since p j (x) = p j (x), there exists at least one coefficient in p j (x) which is different from the corresponding coefficient in Proof. Since no two honest wires contradict each other, from Lemma 4, all the wires removed by R during step 1 of message recovery are indeed faulty. We now show that if a wire is corrupted and delivered incorrect polynomial, then it will be contradicted by all the honest wires with high probability. This will ensure that the corrupted wire will be removed in step 1 of the message recovery.
Let π ij be the probability that a corrupted wire w j will not be contradicted by a honest wire w i . This means that the adversary can ensure that p j (α i ) = p j (α i ) with a probability of π ij . Since there are only n − 1 points at which these two polynomials intersect and since α i was selected uniformly at random from F, we have π ij ≤ n−1 |F| for each i, j. Thus the total probability that the adversary can find w i , w j such that corrupted wire w j will not be contradicted by an honest wire w i is at most i,j π ij ≤ n 2 (n−1) |F| which is bounded by
δ , it follows that a Byzantine corrupted wire w j will be contradicted by all the honest wires with very high probability. In other words, a corrupted p j (x) = p j (x), received over w j may be included in D with probability at most δ. However, if such a p j (x) is included in D , then from Lemma 5, R will detect this and will output "NULL". Thus protocol URMT Single Phase is a strong URMT protocol and outputs correct message m with probability at least 1 − δ. δ and δ be the maximum probability of R outputting "NULL".
2 From Comparison 2, a communication optimal URMT protocol tolerating A t b should achieve message transmission with constant factor overhead. Our URMT Single Phase is one such communication optimal protocol. So we have the following corollary. 
Multiphase URMT tolerating
We now briefly discuss about the communication complexity of multiphase URMT protocols tolerating
Theorem 7 Any multiphase URMT protocol between S and R over n ≥ 2t b + t o + t f + 1 wires communicates Ω( ) field elements to send a message containing field elements against
Proof: The lower bound of Ω( ) for sending field elements is obvious, since any URMT protocol must send at least the message. An O(log
) phase PRMT protocol which sends field elements by communicating O( ) field elements is presented in [38] . The protocol of [38] is also a valid multiphase URMT (since any PRMT is by default an URMT protocol with δ = 0) which satisfies the communication complexity lower bound for multiphase URMT.
2 We do not know whether there exists an URMT protocol with less number of phases, which sends field elements by communicating O( ) field elements. Design of such a protocol is left as an open problem.
Comparison of PRMT with URMT
We now compare the results of URMT presented in this section, with the existing results for PRMT. The comparison can be listed as follows:
1. Allowing a negligible error probability in the reliability does not help in the possibility of reliable message transmission protocols (see Comparison 1).
2. Allowing a negligible error probability in the reliability significantly reduces the communication complexity of reliable message transmission protocols (see Comparison 2).
3. In the presence of A t b , it is impossible to design any single phase PRMT protocol which achieves reliability with "constant factor overhead"; i.e., sending field elements by communicating O( ) field elements (see Comparison 2) . The minimum number of phases required by any PRMT protocol to achieve reliability with "constant factor overhead" is 3 [27] . However, it is possible to design a single phase URMT, which under the presence of only Byzantine adversary, achieves reliability with "constant factor overhead" (see Corollary 1). This again shows the power of allowing a negligible error probability in the context of reliable message transmission.
Single Phase USMT Tolerating
In this section, we prove the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of any single phase USMT protocol in the presence of
. We then prove the lower bound on the communication complexity of any single phase USMT protocol and show that our bound is tight by designing a communication optimal single phase USMT protocol. Kurosawa et. al [21] proved the lower bound on the communication complexity of any single phase USMT protocol tolerating A t b and also presented a near optimum single phase USMT protocol whose total communication complexity approximately matches the bound given in [21] . But the USMT protocol of [21] requires exponential (in n) computation. We show that our communication optimal USMT protocol when executed against A t b provides a polynomial time communication optimal USMT protocol satisfying the lower bound presented in [21] . As a special case, we also show that in the presence of A t b (i.e., t o = t f = t p = 0), if 3t b + 1 wires are available, then our single phase USMT protocol achieves security with constant factor overhead. From [10] , any single phase PSMT tolerating A t b requires n = 3t b + 1 wires between S and R. Moreover from [13, 37] , any single phase PSMT tolerating A t b needs to communicate Ω(n ) field elements to securely send a message containing field elements. Thus with n = 3t b + 1 wires, while it is impossible to design any single phase PSMT protocol with constant factor overhead, it is possible to obtain single phase USMT protocol with constant factor overhead. Finally we compare our results on single phase USMT with the existing results for single phase PSMT. Our comparison shows that allowing a negligible error probability only in the reliability, significantly helps in the possibility and reducing the communication complexity of single phase secure message transmission protocols. Proof: We first prove the lower bound on the communication complexity. Since perfect secrecy is required, the data (or shares) sent along the n wires in any single phase USMT protocol must be such that information on any set of (t b + t o + t p ) wires has no information about the secret message, otherwise the adversary will also know the secret message by passively listening the contents of these wires (recall that the eavesdropping capability of the adversary is at most t b + t o + t p ). Similarly, the data (shares) sent over any (n − (t b + t o + t f )) honest wires during the protocol have full information about the secret message. The latter requirement ensures that even if the adversary simply blocks/corrupts all the data that he can, the secret message is not lost and therefore the receiver's ability to recover the message is not completely ruled out.
Single Phase USMT Protocol Tolerating
Let X i denotes the i th share of some valid distribution scheme and let m denote the secret message containing field elements. Then m can be viewed as a value drawn uniformly at random from F . For any subset A ⊆ {1, 2 . . . n} let X A denote the set of variables {X i |i ∈ A}. Then the secret m and the shares X i are random variables. For a random variable X, let H(X) denote its entropy [6] . Roughly speaking, entropy quantifies the information contained in a message.Since m is drawn uniformly at random from F , we have H(m) = .
Since in any single phase USMT protocol, the data sent along any set B consisting of (n−(t b +t o +t f )) honest wires have full information about m, we have
Consider any subset A ⊂ B such that |A| = (t b + t o + t p ). Since the data sent along the wires in A is insufficient to retrieve any information about the message m we get
From the chain rule of the entropy [6] , for any two random variable X 1 , X 2 , we have
. Here H(X 1 , X 2 ) denotes the joint entropy of X 1 , X 2 . Informally, the joint entropy measures how much entropy is contained in a joint system of two random variables. Similarly, H(X 1 |X 2 ) denotes conditional entropy of X 1 on X 2 . Informally, it quantifies the remaining entropy (i.e. uncertainty) of X 1 given that the value of a second random variable X 2 is known. Substituting X 1 = m|X A and X 2 = X B−A , we get
From the properties of joint entropy [6] , for any two variables X 1 , X 2 , we have H(X 1 , X 2 ) ≥ H(X 1 ) and 
Summing the above equation over all possible sets of size
Now in all the possible
Now, right hand side of the equation is nothing but
H(X i ) defines the information content over n wires, which is sent during any single phase USMT protocol, the lower bound on the communication complexity of any single phase USMT protocol is Ω n n− (2t b +2t o +t f +t p ) . The proof of the lower bound completes at this point. We now derive the necessary condition for the possibility of single phase USMT protocol directly from the lower bound expression.
Since the communication complexity of any single phase USMT protocol should be positive, we have [34] ). With n = 3t b +2t o +t f +t p +1, the lower bounds for PSMT and USMT become Ω (n ) and Ω In the sequel, we design a single phase communication optimal USMT protocol, whose total communication complexity matches the bound proved in Theorem 8, thus showing that the bound is tight.
Single Phase Communication Optimal USMT Tolerating A (t b ,to,t f ,tp)
We now present a single phase communication optimal USMT protocol USMT Single Phase which securely sends a message containing t b + t o + t f + t p + 1 = Θ(n) field elements by communicating O(n 2 ) field elements, where S and R are connected by n = 2t b + 2t o + t f + t p + 1 wires. This shows that the lower bound on the communication complexity, established in Theorem 8 is tight. We require the field size |F| ≥ 2n 3 δ , to realize an error probability of at most δ in USMT Single Phase. We first briefly recall an algorithm from [35] , which we have used as a black-box in our USMT protocol. Consider the following problem: Suppose S and R by some means agree on a sequence of n values x = [x 1 x 2 . . . x n ] ∈ F n such that the adversary only knows n − f values in x. But neither S nor R knows the identity of the values which are known to the adversary. The goal is for S and R to agree on a sequence of f values [y 1 y 2 . . . y f ] ∈ F f , such that the adversary has no information about [y 1 y 2 . . . y f ] in information theoretic sense. This is achieved by the following algorithm [35] : Algorithm EXTRAND n,f (x). Let V be a n × f Vandermonde matrix with members in F. This matrix is published as a part of the algorithm specification. S and R both locally compute the product [ Proof: The proof follows from the fact that any f × f sub-determinant in a n × f Vandermonde matrix is non-zero.
2 Now we explain a method which is used to establish a one time pad between S and R. We call our method as Pad Establishment Technique which is very similar to Extrapolation Technique discussed in section 3. , which are independent of each other and the secret message m. From these elements S generates the rectangular array D containing n × (n + tp) field elements using Pad Establishment Technique.
Pad Establishment Technique:
2. S then forms n polynomials p j (x), 1 ≤ j ≤ n, each of degree n − 1 + tp where pj(x) is formed using the j th row of D as follows: the coefficient of
is the (i + 1) th element of j th row of D.
3. S chooses another n secret and random field elements, α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n . Over w j , S sends the following to R: the polynomial pj(x), the secret value αj and the n tuple {pi(αj) : 3. To retrieve m, R needs the vector y, which in turn is constructed from the list E. So to get the list E, R tries to reconstruct the array D as generated originally by S. Let D be the array, corresponding to D which R tries to recover at his end. D is constructed as follows: Corresponding to each w j ∈ W \ (F ∪ B), which is not removed in previous step, R fills the j th row of D in the following manner: coefficient of
S then prepares a list E which consist of coefficients of all
th column in the j th row of D ; i.e., the coefficients of p j (x) are inserted in j th row of D such that the coefficient of x i in p j (x) occupies (i + 1) th column in the j th row of D .
After doing the above step for each wj ∈ W \ (F ∪ B)
, which is not removed in step 2 of message recovery, R will have at least t b + t o + t p + 1 rows inserted in D (see Lemma 12) . R then checks the validity of these rows as follows: ) lie on a t b + to + tp degree polynomial. Note that at this point, each column will have at least t b + t o + t p + 1 elements, which are enough to do the checking.
5. If the above test fails for at least one column of D , then R outputs "NULL" and halts. Otherwise, using the already inserted rows of D , R regenerates the complete D correctly (see Lemma 12) . R now knows all the polynomials p i (x), 1 ≤ i ≤ n and hence the list E, which is the concatenation of rows of D. Proof: We consider the worst case, where t o + t f wires which are omission and failstop corrupted, gets crashed and fail to deliver any information to R. Thus R gets information over 2t b + t o + t p + 1 wires, of which at most t b could be Byzantine corrupted. Also, out of these wires, at least t b + t o + t p + 1 are honest and correctly delivered the polynomials and values to R. So t b + t o + t p + 1 rows corresponding to these correct polynomials will be present in D . This is because an honest wire which has correctly delivered the polynomial can be contradicted by at most (t b − |B|) wires. Hence the honest wires will not be removed by R during step 2 of message recovery and so the coefficients of the polynomials corresponding to these wires will be present in D . Now if a wire w j which has delivered a faulty polynomial p j (x) = p j (x) to R, is not removed during step 2 of message recovery, then the coefficients of p j (x) are inserted in the j th row of D . Since p j (x) = p j (x), there will be at least one (there can be more than one) coefficient in p j (x), which is different from the corresponding coefficient in δ , then protocol USMT Single Phase is a strong USMT protocol and terminates with the correct message m with probability at least 1 − δ.
Proof: From the protocol, it is easy to see that no two honest wires (which has delivered correct values and polynomials) contradict each other. From Lemma 10, all the wires removed by R during step 2 of message recovery are indeed faulty. We now show that if a wire has delivered incorrect polynomial, then it will be contradicted by all the honest wires with high probability. Let π ij be the probability that a corrupted wire w j , which has delivered incorrect p j (x) = p j (x) will not be contradicted by an honest wire w i . This means that the adversary can ensure that p j (α i ) = p j (α i ) with a probability of π ij . Since there are only n − 1 + t p points at which these two polynomials intersect (the degree of p j and p j is n − 1 + t p ) and since α i was selected uniformly at random from F, we have π ij ≤ n−1+t p |F| for each i, j. Thus the total probability that the adversary can find w i , w j such that corrupted wire w j will not be contradicted by
δ , it follows that corrupted p j (x) = p j (x), received over a corrupted wire w j can be included in D with probability at most δ. However, if such a p j (x) is included in D , then from Lemma 11, R will detect this and will output "NULL". Thus protocol USMT Single Phase is a strong USMT protocol and outputs correct message with probability at least 1 − δ. Proof: Over each wire, S sends a polynomial of degree n − 1 + t p and an n tuple. Thus the total communication complexity is n × (n + t p + n) = O(n 2 ). Since each field element from field F can be represented by log |F| bits, the communication complexity of the protocol is O(n 2 log |F|) bits. The protocol securely sends (
. By substituting n = 2t b + 2t o + t f + t p + 1 and = Θ(n) in Theorem 8, we get that any single phase USMT protocol need to communicate Ω(n 2 ) field elements to securely send Θ(n) field elements. However, the total communication complexity of our protocol is O(n 2 ). Hence our protocol is communication optimal. 2
Single Phase USMT with Constant Factor Overhead Tolerating A t b
From [10] , any single phase PSMT tolerating A t b requires n = 3t b + 1 wires between S and R. Moreover from [13, 37] , any single phase PSMT tolerating A t b needs to communicate Ω(n ) field elements to securely send a message containing field elements over a 3t b + 1-(S,R) connected network. We now show that if n = 3t b + 1, then there exists a single phase (strong) USMT protocol with error probability of at most δ, which sends a message containing field elements by communicating O( ) field elements tolerating A t b . In terms of bits, the protocols securely sends log |F| bits by communicating O( log |F|) bits, where |F| is a function of error probability δ. Thus we get security with constant factor overhead in a single phase, with negligible error probability. This is interesting because with n = 3t b + 1 wires, it is impossible to achieve perfect secrecy with constant factor overhead. If we execute our single phase USMT protocol USMT Single Phase against only A t b over n = 2t b +1 wires (i.e., t o = t f = t p = 0), then the protocol securely sends t b + 1 = Θ(n) field elements (if n = 2t b + 1, then t b = Θ(n)) by communicating O(n 2 ) field elements. However, if n = 3t b + 1, then the same protocol can securely send Θ(t 2 b ) = Θ(n 2 ) field elements by communicating O(n 2 ) field elements. In terms of bits, the USMT protocol will send Θ(n 2 ) log(|F|) bits by communicating O(n 2 ) log(|F|) bits, where |F| ≥ Proof: Follows from the above discussion. 
Lower Bound on Communication Complexity [21] and Our Polynomial Time Single Phase Communication Optimal USMT Protocol Tolerating A t b
In [21] , the authors have shown that single phase USMT tolerating A t b is possible iff n ≥ 2t b + 1. In addition, they have shown that for any single phase USMT protocol with n = 2t b + 1, the following must hold
where S denotes the set of possible secret messages from which S intends to send one element to R, X i denotes the set of possible data sent through the i th wire in the protocol and 0 < δ < 1 2 is the error probability of the protocol. In any single phase USMT protocol, one element from X i is sent through the i th channel. Now each element of X i can be represented by log(|X i |) bits. Similarly, each message from S can be represented by log(|S|) bits. Thus inequality (1) says that any single phase USMT protocol must communicate Ω(n log(|X i |)) bits to securely send log(|S|) bits with error probability of at most 0 < δ < 1 2 . In [21] , the authors have proposed a near optimum single phase USMT protocol whose total communication complexity approximately matches the bound given in inequality (1). However, the computation done by R in their protocol is exponential in n. Here we present a polynomial time single phase USMT protocol satisfying the lower bound given in inequality (1). If we execute our single phase USMT protocol USMT Single Phase against only A t b over n = 2t b + 1 wires (i.e., t o = t f = t p = 0), then the protocol securely sends t b + 1 = Θ(n) field elements (if n = 2t b + 1, then t b = Θ(n)) by communicating O(n 2 ) field elements. Recall that the field size |F| must be at least 2n 2 δ for bounding the error probability of USMT Single Phase by δ. We select κ > 0 such that δ ≈ 2 −κ and express the error probability by 2 −κ (instead of δ). So now |F| ≥ 2n 2 2 κ . So a field element can be represented by O(log n + κ) bits. Our protocol securely sends O((t b + 1)(log n + κ)) bits (if n = 2t b + 1, then t b = Θ(n)) by communicating O(n 2 (log n + κ)) bits.
We now show that the communication complexity of our protocol satisfies the bound given in inequality (1). In our protocol message space is F t b +1 . So S = F t b +1 and thus log(|S|) = (t b + 1) log(|F|) = (t b + 1)(log n + κ). Substituting δ = 2 −κ and value of S in inequality (1), we get |X i | = + 1 and thus log(|X i |) ≥ κ + (t b + 1)(log n + κ). So according to the lower bound given by inequality (1), our protocol must communicate Ω(n(t b + 1)(log n + κ)) = Ω(n 2 (log n + κ)) bits to securely send (t b + 1)(log n + κ) = Ω(n(log n + κ)) bits. However, the total communication complexity of our protocol is Θ(n 2 (log n + κ)) bits. Thus our protocol is communication optimal single phase USMT protocol.
Comparison of Single Phase PSMT with Single phase USMT
The comparison between single phase PSMT and single phase USMT can be listed as follows
• Allowing a negligible error probability only in the reliability, significantly helps in the possibility of single phase secure message transmission protocols (see Comparison 3).
• Allowing a negligible error probability only in the reliability, significantly reduces the communication complexity of single phase secure message transmission protocols (see Comparison 4 and Subsection 4.2.1).
Multiphase USMT Tolerating
As mentioned earlier, one of the key parameters of any secure message transmission protocol is the number of phases. In the context of PSMT, it is well known that allowing interaction between S and R significantly helps in reducing the connectivity requirement and lower bound on communication complexity of PSMT protocols (see Table 3 and Table 4 ). In this section, we show that same holds for USMT also. Here we provide the characterization and lower bound on the communication complexity of any multiphase USMT protocol. We also design a four phase USMT protocol whose total communication complexity matches the proven lower bound, thus showing that our lower bound is tight. Comparing these results with the results for single phase USMT, we find that allowing interaction between S and R significantly reduces in the connectivity requirement of USMT and also helps in reducing the communication complexity of USMT protocols. Finally, comparing our results on multiphase USMT with the results on multiphase PSMT (given in last rows of Table 3 and Table 4 ), we observe a notable effect of allowing a negligible error probability in reliability of multiphase secure message transmission protocols.
Characterization for Multiphase USMT Protocol Tolerating A (t b ,to,t f ,tp)
Theorem 13 Multiphase USMT between S and R in an undirected network tolerating a mixed adversary
is possible if and only if the network is
Proof:Necessity: We consider two cases for proving the necessity.
1. Case 1: t p ≤ t b : In this case, the necessity condition says that the network should be (2t b + t o + t f + 1)-(S,R). Since the condition is necessary for URMT (Theorem 2), it is obviously necessary for USMT.
Case 2: t p > t b :
In this case, the the necessity condition says that the network should be (
This condition is necessary for USMT because if the network is (t b + t p + t o + t f )-(S,R)-connected, then the adversary may strategize to simply block all message through (t b + t o + t f ) vertex disjoint paths and thereby ensure that every value received by R is also listened by the adversary. This completely rules out the possibility of information-theoretic security.
Sufficiency: Suppose that network is (t
Then from Menger's theorem [25] , there exist at least n = (t b + max(t b , t p ) + t o + t f + 1) vertex disjoint paths from S to R. We model these paths as wires w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n . We now design a three phase USMT protocol called SECURE to securely send a single field element m ∈ F. The protocol is similar to the USMT protocol of [15] . It can be shown that with a probability of at least 1 − 1 |F| , ρ = ρ and hence R almost always learns the correct message (Proof is similar to that of the correctness of the USMT protocol of [15] ). Since
, there exists at least one wire say w i , which is not controlled by the adversary. So, the corresponding ρ i2 is unknown to adversary implying information theoretic security for ρ = w i ∈H ρ i2 and hence for m. It is easy to see that the communication complexity of SECURE is O(n 2 ) field elements, where the field size |F| is set appropriately as a function of δ. The protocol SECURE is used to prove the sufficiency of Theorem 13. Using it as a black-box, we will design a communication optimal multiphase USMT protocol. Before that, in the sequel we prove the lower bound on the communication complexity of any multiphase USMT protocol.
Lower Bound on the Communication Complexity of Multiphase USMT Protocol
Tolerating
We now prove the lower bound on the communication complexity of any r-phase (r ≥ 2) USMT protocol which sends field elements tolerating a mixed adversary
To prove the lower bound, we use entropy based argument, which is used in [37] for proving the lower bound on the communication complexity of PSMT protocols. Before proving the lower bound, we briefly recall the capabilities of A (t b ,to,t f ,tp) . A Byzantine corrupted wire is actively controlled by the adversary. Thus the adversary fully controls a Byzantine corrupted wire and he can even block such a wire. However, the most adverse affect caused by a Byzantine corrupted wire is when the adversary maliciously changes the information passed over such a wire. If the adversary simply blocks a wire which is controlled in Byzantine fashion, then the adversary is not using its true capability. Also, if the adversary blocks a Byzantine controlled wire, instead of maliciously changing the information passing through such a wire, then both S and R will come to know the identity of the blocked wire and will remove it from the protocol. Similarly, the most adverse affect caused by a omission controlled wire is when the adversary passively listen such a wire. Instead, if the adversary blocks such a Protocol SECURE -A Three Phase USMT Protocol Phase I: S to R • Along w i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, S sends to R two randomly picked elements ρ i1 and ρ i2 chosen from F.
Phase II: R to S • Suppose R receives values in syntactically correct form along n ≤ n wires. R neglects the remaining (n − n ) wires. Let R receives ρ i1 and ρ i2 along wire wi, where wi is not neglected by R.
• R chooses uniformly at random an element K ∈ F. R then broadcasts to S the following: identities of the (n − n ) wires neglected by him, the random K and the values (Kρ i1 + ρ i2 ) for all i such that w i is not neglected by R.
Phase III: S to R • S correctly receives the identities of (n − n ) wires neglected by R during Phase II (because irrespective of the values of t b and tp, n is at least 2t b + to + t f + 1 and any information which is broadcast over n wires will be received correctly). S eliminates these wires. S also correctly receives K and the values, say u i = (Kρ i1 + ρ i2 ) for each i, such that wire w i is not eliminated by R.
• S then computes the set H such that H = {w i |u i = (Kρ i1 + ρ i2 )}. Furthermore, S computes the secret pad ρ where ρ = w i ∈H ρi2. S then broadcasts the set H and the blinded message m ⊕ ρ to R, where m is the single field element, which S wants to send securely to R.
Message Recovery by R • R correctly receives H and computes his version of ρ (which is equal to ρ with very high probability). If z is the blinded message received, R outputs m = z ⊕ ρ .
wire (omission controlled wire can also be blocked by the adversary), then again both S and R will come to know the identity of the wire and will remove it. While proving the lower bound on the communication complexity, we assume that A (t b ,to,t f ,tp) will fully utilize its capability. Thus we assume that the adversary either eavesdrop or maliciously change the information passing through the wires which are controlled in Byzantine fashion. Similarly, instead of blocking omission controlled wires, the adversary only eavesdrop such wires. Thus, without loss of generality, we assume that out of the n wires, A (t b ,t o ,t f ,t p ) controls at most b, F and P wires in Byzantine, failstop and passive fashion respectively, where Proof: The proof follows from Lemma 13 and Lemma 14, which are proved below.
Theorem 14 Any r-phase (r ≥ 2) USMT protocol which securely sends field elements in the presence
A (t b ,to,t f ,tp) needs to communicate Ω n n−(t b +t o +t f +t p ) field elements.
Lemma 13 The communication complexity of any multi-phase USMT protocol to send a message against an adversary corrupting up to
b (≤ t b ), F (≤ t f ) and P (≤ t b + t o + t p ) of
the wires in Byzantine, Fail-stop and passive manner respectively is not less than the communication complexity of distributing n shares for the message such that any set of n − F correct shares has full information about the message while any set of P shares has no information about the message.
To prove the lemma, we begin with defining a weaker version of single-phase USMT called USMT with Error Detection (USMTED). We then prove the equivalence of the communication complexity of USMTED protocol to send message M and the share complexity of distributing n shares for M such that any set of n − F correct shares has full information about M while any set of P shares has no information about M. To prove the aforementioned statement, we show their equivalence (Claim 1). Finally, we will show that the communication complexity of any multiphase USMT protocol is at least equal to the communication complexity of single-phase protocol USMTED (Claim 3). These two equivalence will prove the desired equivalence as stated in this lemma. Note that b, F and P are bounded by t b , t f and t b + t o + t p respectively.
Definition 14 A single phase USMT protocol is called USMTED if it satisfies the following properties:
1. If the adversary is passive on P wires then R correctly and securely receives the message sent by S. 
If the adversary maliciously changes the information over b wires (b
≤ t b ),
The adversary obtains no information about the transmitted message in information theoretic sense.
We next show that the properties of USMTED protocol for sending message M is equivalent to the problem of distributing n shares for M such that any set of n − F correct shares has full information about M while any set of P shares has no information about M. C) . By definition the fail-stop controlled wires can block all the messages sent along the F wires not in C. Thus for two different executions of USMTED to send two distinct message M and M , there exists an adversary strategy such that view of R at the end of two executions is exactly same. This is a contradiction to the property 3 of USMTED protocol Π, which must output the correct message if at most F fail-stop errors and no malicious corruptions take place. 2
The above claim also says that the communication complexity of USMTED protocol to send M is same as the share complexity (sum of the length of all shares) of distributing n shares for a message M such that any set of n − F correct shares has full information about M while any set of P shares has no information about the message. Now we step forward to show that the communication complexity of USMTED protocol is the lower bound on the communication complexity of any multiphase USMT protocol.
Before that we take a closer look at the execution of any multi-phase USMT protocol. S and R are modeled as polynomial time Turing machines with access to a random tape. The number of random bits used by S and R are bounded by a polynomial q(n). Let r 1 , r 2 ∈ {0, 1} q(n) denote the contents of the random tapes of S and R respectively. The message M is an element from the set {0, 1} p(n) , where p(n) is a polynomial. A transcript for an execution of a multiphase USMT protocol Π is the concatenation of all the messages sent by S and R along all the wires. Given (M, r 1 , r 2 ) it is possible for S to compute T (Π, M, r 1 , r 2 ) by simulating R with random tape r 2 . Similarly given (M, r 1 , r 2 ) R can compute T (Π, M, r 1 , r 2 ) by simulating S with random tape r 1 . Note that although S and R require both r 1 , r 2 to generate the transcript, R requires only r 2 in order to obtain the message M from the transcript T (Π, M, r 1 , r 2 ). This is clear since R does not have access to r 1 during the execution of Π but still can retrieve the message M from the messages exchanged.
We next define a special type of passive transcript and prove its properties. • S wants to send M. S and R executes Π while the adversary block the wires in Y to deliver any message. As T B−Y (Π, M, r 1 , r 2 ) is a valid transcript with respect to M, R terminates with output M.
• S wants to send M. S and R executes Π. The adversary block the messages over the wires in Y and changes the messages along wires in X such that the view of S is T B−Y (Π, M, r 1 , r 2 ) but the view of R is
is a valid transcript with respect to M , R will terminate with output M .
The two scenarios differ only in the adversarial behavior and in the contents of R's random tape. In both the scenarios S wanted to send message M. But the message received by receiver R in the second case is an incorrect message M . Thus, with only probability 1/2, R will output the correct message M. This is a contradiction because Π is a USMT protocol. 2 Till now, we have shown that a transcript over at least n − F correct wires allows R to output M correctly. We now show how to reduce a multiphase USMT protocol into a single phase USMTED protocol.
Protocol USMTED
• S computes the passive transcript T (Π, M, r1, r2) for some random r1 and r2 and sends T (Π, M, r1, r2, wi) to R along w i .
• If R does not receive information through at least n − F wires then R outputs ERROR and stop. Otherwise, let R receives information over the set of wires B = {w i 1 , w i 2 , . . . , w iα } where n − F ≤ |B| ≤ n. R concatenates the values received along these wires to obtain a transcript TB (which may be corrupted along t b wires) and does the following:
If T B is a valid transcript with random tape contents r 2 for message M then output M and stop. Output ERROR.
Claim 3 The Communication complexity of any multiphase USMT protocol Π to send M is at least equal to the communication complexity of USMTED protocol. Moreover protocol USMTED satisfies the properties given in Definition 14.
Proof: Let Π be any multiphase USMT protocol and Π passive denotes an execution of Π where the adversary does only eavesdropping and does no other type of corruption during the complete execution. It is easy to see that the communication complexity of Π passive is trivially a lower bound on the communication complexity of any multiphase USMT protocol (where the adversary may do other types of corruptions, in addition to eavesdropping). We now show that the communication complexity of Π passive is same as the communication complexity of USMTED protocol. Once we do this, then the communication complexity of USMTED protocol is a trivial lower bound on the communication complexity of any multiphase USMT protocol.
In USMTED, S assumes its random tape to contain r 1 and R's random tape to contain r 2 . S also assumes that in Π, the adversary will only do eavesdropping and no other type of corruption and generates the passive transcript T (Π, M, r 1 , r 2 ). As explained earlier, S can do so by simulating R, assuming the content of R's random tape to be r 2 . However, note that R neither knows M, nor r 1 , r 2 , which S has used for generating T . S then communicates T to R, by sending the components of T restricted to wire w i , along w i . It is easy to see that the cost of communicating such a transcript by USMTED is same as the communication complexity of Π passive .
The messages sent along wire w i in USMTED protocol is the concatenation of the messages that would have been exchanged between S and R along w i in Π passive . Since Π passive is a special type of execution of USMT protocol Π, by the secrecy property of Π, the adversary cannot obtain any information about the message M by passively listening P ≤ t b + t o + t p wires in USMTED protocol. From Claim 2, we know that valid transcripts of two different messages cannot be adversely close to each other. So irrespective of the actions of the adversary, the transcript received by R cannot be a valid transcript for any message other than M for any value of r 2 . Hence if R outputs a message M then it is the same message sent by S. Thus protocol USMTED satisfies the properties given in Definition 14.
2 Claim 1, along with Claim 3 completes the proof of Lemma 13. We now prove the share complexity of distributing n shares for a message such that any set of n − F correct shares has full information while any set of P shares has no information about the message
Lemma 14
The share-complexity (that is the sum of length of all shares) of distributing n shares for a message of size field elements from F such that any set of n − F correct shares has full information about the message while any set of P shares has no information about the message is Ω( n (n−F −P ) ).
Proof: Let X i denotes the i th share. For any subset A ⊆ {1, 2 . . . n}, let X A denotes the set of variables {X i |i ∈ A}. Let M be a value drawn uniformly at random from F l . Then the secret M and the shares X i are random variables. Let H(X) denotes the entropy of a random variable X. Let H(X|Y ) denotes the entropy of X conditional on Y . The conditional entropy measures the amount of residual entropy of a random variable X after the complete revelation of the value of a second random variable Y [6] . Since M is a value drawn uniformly at random from F , we have H(M) = . Since any set B consisting of n − F correct shares has full information about M, we have H(M|X B ) = 0. Consider any subset A ⊂ B such that |A| = P . Since any set of P shares has no information about M, we have H(M|X A ) = H(M). From the chain rule of the entropy [6] , for any two random variable X 1 , X 2 , we have
Consequently, H(M) ≤ H(X B−A ) because H(M|X A ) = H(M).
Since |B| = n − F and |A| = P , we get |B − A| = n − F − P . So for any set C of size |B − A| = n − F − P ,
Since there are n n−F −P possible subsets of cardinality n − F − P , summing the above equation over all possible subsets of cardinality n − F − P we get
Now in all the possible n n−F −P subsets of size n − F − P , each of the term H(X i ) appears exactly in
H(X i ) denotes the share complexity of M. Thus the share-complexity for any M ∈ F is Ω n n−F −P .
2 In the sequel, we design a four phase communication optimal USMT protocol, whose total communication complexity matches the bound proved in Theorem 14, thus showing that the bound is tight. Also our four phase communication optimal USMT protocol has a special property that it can achieve security with constant factor overhead tolerating A t b .
Upper Bound on the Communication Complexity of MultiPhase USMT Protocol
Here we design a communication optimal multiphase USMT protocol called USMT Mixed tolerating respectively, where δ is the error probability of the protocol. Our four phase USMT protocol has a special property that it securely sends field elements by communicating O( ) field elements tolerating only Byzantine adversary, A t b (i.e., t o = t f = t p = 0). Thus it achieves security with "constant factor overhead" (note that as pointed out in Comparison 6 USMT tolerating A t b is possible with communication complexity satisfying constant factor overhead). . It is evident from the protocol construction that the theorem holds if the following are true:
Remark 7 Since
2. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, y i = y i with probability ≥ (1 − δ 4 ). 3. If the wire w i were indeed Byzantine corrupt (i.e., the n 2 tuple sent over w i is changed by the adversary), then w i ∈ L f ault with probability
The message m is a sequence of n 2 field elements if t b ≤ t p , otherwise it is a sequence of (t b − t p )n 2 field elements.
Phase I (R to S)
• R selects at random n 3 elements, rij, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ n 2 from field F. R also randomly selects ρ1, ρ2, . . . ρn from F.
• R sends to S over w i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the n 2 field elements r ij , 1 ≤ j ≤ n 2 . R also sends ρ i , y i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n to S using 2n parallel invocations of the three phase SECURE protocol (described in Theorem 13) as there are total 2n elements to send. Hence Phase I, II and Phase III are used to run 2n parallel executions of SECURE protocol.
Phase IV (S to R)
• Let S receives r ij , 1 ≤ j ≤ n 2 along wire wi. S adds wi to a list Lerasure, if S does not receive any information over w i .
• Let S receives ρ i and y i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n after the 2n parallel executions of the three phase SECURE protocol initiated by R. For each i, such that wi ∈ Lerasure, S verifies whether
j=1 ρ i j r ij , then S adds wire w i to the set of faulty wires, denoted by
. . , z n 2 ) of size n 2 field elements from the n 2 |L honest | field elements which are received over the wires in L honest as follows:
. However, if t b > t p , then S computes a random pad Z of length (t b − t p )n 2 as follows:
.
• 
If t b > tp, then R computes Z R of size (t b − tp)n 2 field elements as follows:
4. The protocol URMT Single Phase successfully sends the vector d with probability ≥ (1 − δ 4 ). The error probability of the protocol depends upon the error probability of the above four events. If each of the above are true, then our protocol's failure probability is bounded by δ. We now prove that each of the above four conditions are true.
Claim 4
In USMT Mixed, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ρ i = ρ i with probability ≥ (1 − δ 4 ). Proof: In USMT Mixed, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ρ i 's are sent using n parallel execution of the three phase protocol SECURE. From the proof of Theorem 13, the error probability of a single execution of SECURE protocol is at most 1 |F| . Hence the total error probability of n parallel executions of SECURE to communicate ρ i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n is at most n |F| . If |F| ≥ 4n δ , then the total error probability of n parallel executions of SECURE is at most Proof: In USMT Mixed, if t o = t p = t f = 0, then it sends t b n 2 = Θ(n 3 ) field elements in four phases by communicating O(n 3 ) field elements (if t o = t f = t p = 0, then n = 2t b + 1 and so t b = Θ(n)). Thus we get secrecy with constant factor overhead in four phases when USMT Mixed is executed under the presence of only Byzantine adversary. 2 According to Corollary 2, protocol USMT Mixed is able to securely send a message with constant factor overhead in four phases tolerating A t b , where the size of the message is n 2 t b . However, it is possible to design a two phase USMT protocol, which achieves security with constant factor overhead tolerating A t b . We design one such protocol in the next section.
Two Phase USMT with Constant Factor Overhead Tolerating A t b
The connectivity requirement for any multiphase USMT tolerating only Byzantine adversary A t b is n ≥ 2t b + 1 (by substituting t o = t f = t p = 0 in Theorem 13). We now design a two phase USMT protocol called USMT Byzantine, where S and R are connected by n = 2t b + 1 wires. The protocol securely sends n(t b + 1) = Θ(n 2 ) field elements by communicating O(n 2 ) field elements tolerating A t b . Thus we get security with "constant factor" overhead in two phases. We denote the message by m = (m 1 m 2 . . . m n(t b +1) ). In our protocol, we use following two protocols as black-box. Phase I (R to S)
• R selects at random n 2 random elements, say r ij , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, which are independent of each other and m from the finite field F. R also randomly selects ρ 1 , ρ 2 , . . . ρ n from F and computes y i = • Through wire wi, R sends the n field elements ri1, ri2, . . . rin to S. R also securely sends ρi, yi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n to S, using four parallel invocations of the single phase USMT Single Phase protocol (by considering t o = t f = t p = 0 and n = 2t b + 1).
Phase II (S to R)
• Let S receives the values r ij , 1 ≤ j ≤ n along the wire wi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Also let S receive ρ i and y i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n after the parallel execution of single phase USMT protocol USMT Single Phase initiated by R.
• For each i, S verifies whether y i ? = n j=1 ρ i j r ij . If the test fails, then S adds wire w i to the set of faulty wires, denoted by L f aulty .
• S sets L honest = W \ L f aulty . Now, S computes a random pad Z = (z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z n(t b +1) ) of size n(t b + 1) field elements as follows:
• S computes d = m ⊕ Z and reliably sends d to R using the single phase URMT Single Phase protocol. S also broadcasts the set L f aulty to R.
Message recovery by R.
• R correctly receives the set L f aulty (by taking the majority of the sets received along the wires) and sets L honest = W \ L f aulty . R also correctly (probably) receive the vector d (from the correctness of URMT Single Phase).
• R computes the pad Z R = (z 
• R recovers the message by computing m = Z R ⊕ d.
We now prove the correctness of protocol USMT Byzantine. 
Theorem 22 Protocol USMT Byzantine is a communication optimal two phase USMT protocol tolerating Byzantine adversary.
Proof: USMT Byzantine sends n(t b + 1) log |F| = Θ(n 2 log |F|) bits (for n = 2t b + 1, t b = Θ(n)) by communicating O(n 2 log |F|) bits. Hence it is a communication optimal protocol. Moreover it is phase optimal because from Theorem 8, by substituting t o = t f = t p = 0, we find that any single phase USMT requires a communication overhead of O(n 3 log(|F|)) bits to securely send n(t b + 1) log |F| = Θ(n 2 log |F|) bits. 2
Comparison of MultiPhase PSMT with MultiPhase USMT
1. Allowing a negligible error probability only in the reliability, significantly helps in the possibility of multiphase secure message transmission protocols (see Comparison 5).
2. Allowing a negligible error probability only in the reliability, significantly helps in reducing the lower bound on communication complexity of multiphase secure message transmission protocols (see Comparison 6) .
3. It is impossible to design any PSMT protocol, irrespective of the number of phases, which achieves security with constant factor overhead; i.e., securely sending field elements by communicating O( ) field elements tolerating A t b (see Table 3 , second row) in a (2t b + 1)-(S,R) connected network. However, there exists a two phase USMT protocol which securely sends field elements by communicating O( ) field elements, thus achieving security with constant factor overhead (Protocol USMT Byzantine). Thus allowing a negligible error probability in the reliability without sacrificing the security, helps to design a two phase secure message transmission protocol, which achieves security with constant factor overhead.
Conclusion and Open Problems
We have studied the problem of URMT and USMT in the presence of mixed adversary. Existing URMT and USMT protocols deals with only Byzantine adversary. Moreover, the protocols are not optimal in terms of communication complexity. In this paper, we initiated the study of URMT and USMT tolerating mixed adversary. We have given the complete characterization of single phase and multiphase URMT protocols in undirected networks tolerating mixed adversary. We have proved the lower bound on the communication complexity of any single phase and multi phase URMT protocol. Moreover, we have shown that our bounds are tight by designing communication optimal protocols. Similarly, we have given complete characterization of single phase and multiphase USMT protocols in undirected networks tolerating mixed adversary. We have proved the lower bound on the communication complexity of any single phase and multi phase USMT protocol. Moreover, we have shown that our bounds are tight by designing communication optimal protocols. The paper shows that allowing a negligible error probability has strong effect in the possibility, feasibility and optimality of reliable and secure message transmission protocols. Our protocols achieve communication optimality for sufficiently long messages. The next obvious and interesting problem is to design communication optimal protocols for messages of any length. Another interesting problem is to find the minimum number of phases required by any URMT protocol which achieves reliability with constant factor overhead under the presence of mixed adversary; i.e., sending field elements with a communicating overhead of O( ) field elements.
